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1 Introduction
In the incomplete contracting literature, the hold-up problem plays an impor-
tant role (see Hart, 1995). In a standard hold-up problem under symmetric
information, an agent has insuﬃcient incentives to invest today, because to-
morrow a part of the returns of his investment will go to the agent’s trading
partner. It has been shown in the literature that hold-up problems can be
mitigated if the agent privately learns his type (before or after the invest-
ment stage). Intuitively, due to his private information the agent will get an
information rent tomorrow, which today increases his incentives to invest.1
Most papers in the literature on hold-up problems consider private goods
only. In a notable exception, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have studied an in-
complete contracting model with public goods.2 Yet, they consider the case
of symmetric information only. In contrast, in the present paper we analyze
a variant of Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) public goods framework under asym-
metric information.
It turns out that in a hold-up problem with public goods, the eﬀects of
asymmetric information crucially depend on the sequence of events. If the
agent privately learns his type after his investment decision, the presence of
asymmetric information can only improve investment incentives (as in the
case of private goods). However, if the agent privately learns his type before
the investment stage, asymmetric information can only decrease the agent’s
incentives to invest.
1See e.g. the early contribution by Tirole (1986), the papers by Gul (2001) and González
(2004) who study unobservable investments, and the papers by Schmitz (2006, 2008) and
Goldlücke and Schmitz (2011) who analyze observable investments in settings with incom-
plete information.
2See also the subsequent work by Halonen-Akatwijuka and Pafilis (2009), Francesconi
and Muthoo (2011), and Halonen-Akatwijuka (2012).
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2 The model
There are two risk-neutral parties, a principal (the government) and an agent
(a non-governmental organization). At some initial date 1, the agent can make
an observable but non-contractible investment i ≥ 0. Following the incomplete
contracting approach, it is assumed that ex ante the public good which can be
produced with the help of the agent’s investment cannot yet be described, so
that no contract can be written before the investment is made.3 However, at
date 2 the principal can oﬀer a contract to the agent. If the agent accepts the
contract, the parties collaborate so that they together produce the quantity
y(i) of the public good (where y(0) = 0 and y0(i) > 0, y00(i) < 0 for all i > 0).
In contrast, if the agent rejects the oﬀered contract, there is no collaboration,
but the agent can still use his investment to produce the quantity λy(i) of the
public good good, where λ ∈ (0, 1).
The principal’s valuation of the good is commonly known and normalized
to 1. As in Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), the principal’s valuation can
be interpreted as the benefit that the rest of the society (i.e., everyone except
the agent) derives from the public good. The agent’s valuation is denoted
by θ ∈ {θl, θh}, where 0 < θl < θh < 1 and Pr{θ = θl} = p ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, we assume that society’s benefit from the public good is larger than the
agent’s benefit.4 In line with Besley and Ghatak (2001), we make the following
3See Hart and Moore (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999) for discussions of the incom-
plete contracting paradigm.
4Note that in the case of a private good, if the parties agree to collaborate, then the
principal uses the good (since her valuation is larger). Hence, the principal’s payoﬀ is
up = y(i)− t and the agent’s payoﬀ is uA = t− i, where t is a transfer payment. If the agent
rejects, then the principal’s payoﬀ is uP = 0 and the agent’s payoﬀ is uA = θλy(i) − i. In
such a private good model, compared to the symmetric information benchmark, the agent’s
investment incentives can only increase if he privately learns his type (regardless of whether
he learns his type before or after the investment stage). For details, see e.g. the more general
models in Schmitz (2006) and Goldlücke and Schmitz (2011).
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assumption. If the parties collaborate at date 2, then both parties benefit from
the produced quantity y(i). Thus, the principal’s payoﬀ is uP = y(i)− t and
the agent’s payoﬀ is uA = θy(i)+ t− i, where t is a transfer payment on which
the parties agree. In contrast, if the parties do not reach an agreement to
collaborate, so that only the quantity λy(i) of the public good is produced, then
the principal’s payoﬀ is uP = λy(i) and the agent’s payoﬀ is uA = θλy(i)− i.
3 Scenario I
In scenario I, the agent’s type is realized after the investment stage.
date 1 date 1.5 date 2
––––|–––––––––––|––––––––––––|––––––––—>
agent invests i type θ realized parties may collaborate
Figure 1. The sequence of events in Scenario I.
3.1 The first-best benchmark
In a first-best world, ex post eﬃciency would always be achieved (i.e., the
parties would collaborate at date 2). The first-best investment level is given
by iFBI = argmaxE[(1 + θ)y(i)]− i.
For any ξ ≥ 0, let I(ξ) := argmax ξy(i)−i. Hence, the first-best investment
level in scenario I is given by iFBI = I(1 +E[θ]).
3.2 Symmetric information
Now consider an incomplete contracting world in which contracts can only be
written at date 2. There is symmetric information about the agent’s type.
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At date 2, the principal oﬀers to collaborate with the agent when the agent
accepts the transfer payment t. The agent will accept if t ≥ T (θ, i) := (θλ −
θ)y(i), because then the agent’s date-2 payoﬀ is larger in case of acceptance
(θy(i)+t) than in case of rejection (θλy(i)). Anticipating the agent’s behavior,
the principal will make the oﬀer T (θ, i), so that her payoﬀ is (1 + θ− θλ)y(i),
which is larger than the payoﬀ she gets when no agreement is reached (λy(i)).
At date 1, the agent thus chooses the investment level iSII = I(λE[θ]).
Note that I(ξ) is an increasing function. Thus, there is underinvestment
compared to the first-best benchmark. The social marginal return of the in-
vestment is 1+E[θ], but since ex post the principal will push the agent to his
disagreement payoﬀ θλy(i), the agent’s marginal return is only λE[θ].
3.3 Asymmetric information
Now consider the case in which only the agent privately learns the realization
of his type θ at date 1.5. If the principal makes the oﬀer T (θl, i), the agent will
always accept the oﬀer regardless of his type, so that the principal’s payoﬀ is
(1 + θl − θlλ)y(i). If instead the principal oﬀers T (θh, i), the agent will accept
whenever θ = θh, so that the principal’s expected payoﬀ is [pλ+(1−p)(1+θh−
θhλ)]y(i). Therefore,5 if p ≥ (θh − θl) /(1 + θh) the principal oﬀers t = T (θl, i)
(so that the agent’s expected date-2 payoﬀ is [pθlλ+(1−p)(θh−θl+θlλ)]y(i)),
while otherwise the principal oﬀers t = T (θh, i) (so that the agent’s expected
date-2 payoﬀ is E[θ]λy(i)). Thus, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 Consider scenario I.
(a) Under asymmetric information, the agent invests iAII = I(λE[θ] +
5Note that oﬀers strictly smaller than T (θh, i) would always be rejected, oﬀers strictly
between T (θh, i) and T (θl, i) would be accepted by the type θh only (so that the oﬀer T (θh, i)
is more profitable for the principal), and oﬀers strictly larger than T (θl, i) would always be
accepted (so that the oﬀer T (θl, i) is more profitable).
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(1− p) (1− λ) (θh − θl)) if p ≥ (θh − θl) /(1 + θh), and iAII = I(λE[θ]) oth-
erwise.
(b) Hence, the presence of asymmetric information can only increase the
agent’s incentives to invest.
If the prior probability p of the type θl is suﬃciently large, the principal of-
fers T (θl, i). Type θl then gets his disagreement payoﬀ, while type θh enjoys an
information rent. As a consequence, while there is still underinvestment com-
pared to the first-best benchmark, at date 1 the agent’s investment incentives
are larger than in the case of symmetric information.6
In contrast, if p is small, then the principal oﬀers T (θh, i), which will be
accepted by the type θh and rejected by the type θl, so that both types are
pushed to their reservation utilities and the investment incentives are thus as
in the case of symmetric information.
4 Scenario II
In scenario II, the agent’s type is realized before the investment stage.
date 0.5 date 1 date 2
––––|–––––––––––|––––––––––––|––––––––—>
type θ realized agent invests i parties may collaborate
Figure 2. The sequence of events in Scenario II.
6Note that in the private good setting of footnote 4, an agent of type θl would get an
information rent if p were suﬃciently small, which however would similarly increase the
incentives to invest at date 1.
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4.1 The first-best benchmark
In a first-best world, ex post eﬃciency would always be achieved and the first-
best investment levels depending on the agent’s type θ are given by iFBII (θ) =
I(1 + θ).
4.2 Symmetric information
Consider an incomplete contracting world in which contracts can only be writ-
ten at date 2 and there is symmetric information. In analogy to the analysis
of Section 3.2, the principal will make the oﬀer T (θ, i). At date 1, the agent
thus chooses the investment level iSIII (θ) = I(λθ). Thus, there is again under-
investment compared to the first-best benchmark.
4.3 Asymmetric information
Now consider the case in which only the agent privately learns the realization
of his type θ at date 0.5. The principal may now update his belief about the
agent’s type when she observes the chosen investment level i. If the principal
believes that θ = θl with probability pˆ, then in analogy to Section 3.3, the
principal oﬀers T (θl, i) if pˆ ≥ (θh − θl) /(1 + θh), and T (θh, i) otherwise.
Consider an agent of type θl. He knows that either he will get the oﬀer
T (θl, i) which he will accept, or he will get the oﬀer T (θh, i) which he will
reject. In both cases, his date-2 payoﬀ is θlλy(i). Hence, an agent of type θl
will always choose the investment level I(λθl).
An agent of type θh reveals his type if he chooses an investment level
diﬀerent from I(λθl). In a separating equilibrium, an agent of type θh invests
I(λθh) and gets the oﬀer T (θh, I(λθh)) (since the principal then believes pˆ =
0), while an agent of type θl invests I(λθl) and gets the oﬀer T (θl, I(λθl))
(since the principal believes pˆ = 1). The separating equilibrium exists if the
agent of type θh has no incentive to mimic an agent of type θl, i.e. whenever
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θhλy(I(λθh))− I(λθh) ≥ (θh − θl + θlλ)y(I(λθl))− I(λθl).
If the separating equilibrium does not exist and if p ≥ (θh − θl) /(1 + θh),
there is pooling equilibrium, so that at date 1 both types of the agent invest
I(λθl) and at date 2 the principal oﬀers T (θl, I(λθl)) (since the principal’s
belief pˆ is always equal to the prior probability p).
Finally, if the separating equilibrium does not exist and p < (θh − θl) /(1+
θh), there is a semi-separating equilibrium in which an agent of type θh chooses
the investment level I(λθh) with probability α and he chooses I(λθl) with prob-
ability 1−α. Recall that an agent of type θl always invests I(λθl). Hence, when
the principal observes the investment level I(λθh), her belief pˆ is equal to 0
and she oﬀers T (θh, I(λθh)). When the principal observes the investment level
I(λθl), her belief pˆ is equal to p/[1−α(1−p)]. Suppose she then makes the of-
fer T (θh, I(λθl)) with probability β and the oﬀer T (θl, I(λθl)) with probability
1− β.
Specifically, β = [(θh − θl + θlλ)y(I(λθl)) − I(λθl) − (θhλy(I(λθh)) −
I(λθh))]/[(1−λ)(θh−θl)y(I(λθl))], so that an agent of type θh is indiﬀerent be-
tween the investment levels I(λθh) (yielding the payoﬀ θhλy(I(λθh))− I(λθh))
and I(λθl) (yielding the payoﬀ βθhλy(I(λθl))+(1−β)(θh−θl+θlλ)y(I(λθl))−
I(λθl)). Note that β is positive whenever the separating equilibrium does not
exist, and it is straightforward to check that β is smaller than 1. Moreover,
α = [(θh− θl)− p(1+ θh)]/[(1− p)(θh− θl)], so that the principal is indiﬀerent
between the oﬀers T (θl, I(λθl)) and T (θh, I(λθl)) when she observes the invest-
ment level I(λθl), because pˆ = p/[1−α(1−p)] = (θh − θl) /(1+θh). Note that
α is smaller than 1 and that α is positive whenever p < (θh − θl) /(1 + θh).
Proposition 2 Consider scenario II.
(a) Under asymmetric information, there exists a separating equilibrium
whenever θhλy(I(λθh)) − I(λθh) ≥ (θh − θl + θlλ)y(I(λθl)) − I(λθl), so that
an agent of type θ invests iAIII (θ) = I(λθ). When the separating equilibrium
does not exist, if p ≥ (θh − θl) /(1+ θh) there is a pooling equilibrium in which
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iAIII (θl) = i
AI
II (θh) = I(λθl), and otherwise there is a semi-separating equilibrium
in which an agent of type θl invests iAIII (θl) = I(λθl) and an agent of type θh
mixes between iAIII (θh) = I(λθl) and i
AI
II (θh) = I(λθh).
(b) Hence, in scenario II the presence of asymmetric information has no
influence on the investment incentives of an agent of type θl, while it can only
decrease the investment incentives of an agent of type θh.
Note that in the separating equilibrium, the investment levels are identi-
cal to the investment levels in the case of symmetric information, since both
types are pushed to their disagreement payoﬀs. In contrast, in the pooling
equilibrium and in the semi-separating equilibrium, an agent of type θh gets
an information rent. Nevertheless, the investment incentives of the agent are
now smaller than in the case of symmetric information, since he mimics the
behavior of an agent of type θl.7 Finally, note that the condition under which
the separating equilibrium does not exist and hence the investment incentives
are strictly smaller may well be satisfied.8
7This is in contrast to the case of a private good (cf. footnote 4), in which a low type has
an incentive to mimic a high type.
8For example, let y(i) =
√
i, λ = 0.2, p = 0.3, and θl = 0.1. Then a separating
equilibrium exists only if θh is larger than 0.9.
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